Canada Foreign Policy
Saturday, May 15, 2004
  Terror Canada, and They Say They’ll Leave


Some very quiet events over the past few days may, many, many years from now, come to be regarded as a point that marked a departure from how foreign policy is conducted. Right now, undoubtedly the worst thing that could happen to Prime Minister Paul Martin and Tory leader Stephen Harper is a public demand to treat international politics as a top priority. That just won’t happen this year, but if it were to take place, the upcoming late June election could get very interesting.

Harper has already said that he supports the idea of a much more active Canadian role in Iraq, a position he might not want to have brought up just yet. Martin has embraced former Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s decision to keep the Canadian military formally out of Iraq, even noting the idea of an intervention has always been unpopular with Canadians. Both leaders may just come to the understanding that avoiding foreign affairs as much as possible may be the best way to secure their respective electoral interests. And they will both have so much going for them.

First of all, most Canadians simply don’t think about the outside world. Undoubtedly what they will want to hear from the politicians after the election is called in a week or so is how any new government will fix the health care crisis, manage pensions, take down gas prices at the pumps, and handle the economy. Second, since the end of World War Two, Canada has been on a track that has led it away from traditional geopolitical discourse. While pre-WWII leaders like Bennett and King may have been preoccupied with Empire, world affairs, Canada’s options for exercising independence, the generations growing up since that conflict have thrived in a culture where that type of debate became obsolete. The post-WWII world order has made fashionable peacekeeping, the legacy of Prime Minister Lester Pearson, and an acknowledgement that External Affairs does its best work when it considers the rights of the individual over issues that dwell on state interests. As one observer notes, “During the last few years Canada had successfully attracted attention on the international arena, i.e. due to its ‘human security’ concept, which puts the security of the individual above the security of the state. It was in many respects assisted by the Canadian non-governmental organizations active in the international field whose support was sought as part of the country's ‘public diplomacy’ approach.” [cited in http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id=11&land_id=75]. Finally, Canada has nurtured an academic tradition that affirms a commitment to geopolitics, but which in fact evades the subject almost entirely, replacing analysis of the wider world with discussion of how Canada may limit its global affairs and obligations. Analysts who fall into this camp typically say things like Canada should adopt a psychology of ‘cost cutting,’ deciding, for instance, that making a commitment to the Balkans is too far removed from the national interest, while troubles in, say, Haiti, warrant Ottawa’s close attention.

But the pendulum may be swinging back to a position where the old variables of geopolitics may be making a comeback, perhaps in the decades if not weeks to come. Being able to stand away from talk of traditional world politics may not be an effective strategy for much longer, and the first unambiguous sign comes from what’s taking place around Iraq. In a series of statements made these past days, members of the Coalition have come as close as they are likely to admitting the limitations of their power, and to floating an exit strategy trial balloon. While far from any ‘cut and run’ plan, remarks from high ranking US and UK officials hint at a desire to pull back from the Middle East and to cope with the constraints of their own power by internationalizing managing the war. US Secretary of State Colin Powell went on record stating that any new interim governing authority in Iraq ought to be given as much power as possible. “The United States is anxious to give as much power and authority to this government as it can handle,” he said, also adding that “were this interim government to say to us: ‘We really think we can handle this on our own; it would be better for you to leave,’ we would leave.” [quoted from a piece by Beth Gorham, US Military Abuse Scandal Won’t Affect Co-operation in Iraq, says Graham, 15 May 2004, Canadian Press, posted at http://www.canada.com/national/story.html?id=2fdc3f93-7e93-43a8-b4da-61fd00039b06]. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw echoed Powell, but stressed “I know of nobody . . . who cares about Iraq's future stability who believes that that stability would be best served by an abrupt withdrawal of the multinational forces which are there.” [quoted in Gorham, http://www.canada.com/national/story.html?id=2fdc3f93-7e93-43a8-b4da-61fd00039b06]. US top Administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, read from the same song sheet, observing: “If the provisional government [due to take office 30 June 2004] asks us to leave we will leave…I don’t think that will happen, but obviously we don’t stay in countries where we’re not welcome.” [AP report, 14 May 2004]. It was in this context that troop requests from allied countries were made. For its part, France reaffirmed commitments to reconstruction, but Foreign Minister Michel Barnier also said “There will be no French troops, not here, not now, not tomorrow.” [cited in Gorham]. For his part, Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham said that Canada’s forces were too active and that resources were already stretched to the maximum with efforts in Afghanistan and Haiti.

Graham’s very diplomatic response did not slam shut the door to the possibility of participation at some point. But how will the world look when Canada may have to face this question again? If parties in and around Iraq take at face value claims that coalition forces would consider leaving, a whole series of intriguing and dangerous scenarios may be played out. Best cases rarely materialize, so I assume for the sake of argument here that Iraq will not be transformed into a shining beacon of democracy by early or mid-2005. I shall not entertain optimism. While worst case scenarios are also unlikely, they do help plan for some bleak eventualities that may come up. So the farther away from the best of all possible worlds we go, we might see Iraqis coming to regard troop reductions as a signal that internal ethnic conflicts may come to be played out. Kurds in the north may make a run at outright independence, triggering a Turkish military intervention, which in turn may involve the interests of other Balkan actors, who might traipse through the region, looking for work as ‘consultants’ or ‘contractors.’ Any Iranian Shiite mercenaries already in Iraq may have their numbers swell. Geopolitical instability could rock the wider region, and solutions for containing what could be a growing conflict may have to take account of a number of territories. Rather than perhaps having to cope with a handful of dysfunctional countries that exist as little more than glorified terrorist training camps, the world may have to deal with a dozen or so failed states. How long Canada may remain aloof has already been questioned. Ward Elcock, retiring Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), recently explained at a House of Commons committee meeting that “As Al Qaeda directly threatened Canadians twice in as many years, the last time only a month ago, it is therefore safe to assume that it is no longer a question of if, but rather of when or where, we will be specifically targeted.” [cited in Canadian Press, 6 May 2004].

Paul Martin and Stephen Harper may be grateful that most, if not all, candidates seeking to become Members of Parliament don’t, won’t or simply can’t talk about foreign affairs, and that the Canadian public will not be calling for such a debate in election year 2004.


Stan Markotich
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A discussion of geopolitics and Canada's role in the world. A series of essays to examine the components of Canadian foreign policy making. Psychological, sociological, historical, and cultural variables impacting Canada's perceptions of the world.

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